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Abstract:
Bonds are traded in opaque and fragmented over-the-counter markets. Is there some-
thing special about bonds precluding transparent limit-order markets? Historical experience
suggests this is not the case. Before WWII, there was an active market in corporate and
municipal bonds on the NYSE. Activity dropped dramatically, in the late 1920s for munici-
pals and in the mid 1940s for corporate, as trading migrated to the over-the-counter market.
Average trading costs in municipal bonds on the NYSE were half as large in 1926-1927 as
they are today over the counter. Trading costs in corporate bonds for small investors in the
1940s were as low or lower than they are now. The di¤erence in transactions costs likely re-
ects the di¤erences in market structures, since underlying technological changes have likely
reduced costs of matching buyers and sellers.
2
1 Introduction
Bonds are mostly traded on fragmented and opaque over-the-counter (OTC) markets.1
Stocks, in contrast, are for the most part traded in transparent centralized limit order books.
Why is there such a contrast? Is it inherently problematic to trade bonds on a transparent
limit-order book? Could mandated changes in trading mechanisms lower costs for investors?
Or would regulatory interference simply suppress a natural diversity in institutional arrange-
ments beneting all investors?
Answers to these questions are di¢ cult to obtain through cross-sectional comparisons of
existing markets because liquidity, transactions costs, and trading mechanisms are all jointly
endogenous. Perhaps corporate and municipal bonds have low liquidity and high trading
costs because they are traded in opaque and decentralized dealer markets. Alternatively,
perhaps they trade over the counter because the infrequent need for trade renders the con-
tinuous maintenance of a widely disseminated, centralized limit-order book wasteful and
costly.
We believe the historical experience can shed light on these questions, because it has not
always been the case that equities and bonds were traded in such di¤erent venues. Until the
late 1940s, there was an active market in corporate bonds on the NYSE. In the 1930s, on the
Exchange, the trading volume in bonds was between one fth and one third of the trading
volume in stocks. In earlier periods, there was also an active market for municipal bonds and
government bonds. Indeed, the rst organized exchange in New York, from which the modern
NYSE traces its descent, was established by a group of brokers under the buttonwood tree
to trade U.S. government bonds. Municipal bond trading largely migrated from the exchange
1Lee and Wang (2018) cite a survey nding that 81% of investment grade corporate bonds are traded
by voice. A survey run by the Bank for International setlement (Nagel, 2018, p 13) reports that all-to-all
plaforms (limit order books) amount to only 5% of trading in corporate bonds. From their introduction to the
Dodd Frank act, CDS also were traded in fragmented OTC dealer markets. The Dodd-Frank act mandated
trading of the most liquid index CDS contracts on swap execution facilities. The latter o¤er investors the
choice between a centralized limit order book, electronic request for quotes auctions and bilateral interactions
with dealers. The centralized limit order book failed to attract signicant liquidity. See Collin-Dufresne et
al, 2017, and Riggs et al, 2017.
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in the late 1920s, and volume in corporate bonds dropped dramatically in the late 1940s.2
Since this collapse, bond trading on the Exchange has been limited.
This historical evidence shows that an active bond market with a centralized and trans-
parent limit-order book was feasible. This, in turn, raises other questions. Why did liquidity
dry up on the NYSE? Why has it been so di¢ cult for the exchange to regain volume despite
its periodic attempts to do so? What were the consequences for transactions costs of the
migration of bond trading to the OTC market?
To answer these questions we rst provide institutional information on the microstructure
of the bond market in the twentieth century. We then consider possible explanations for the
drop in the liquidity of the bond market on the Exchange. First, we ask whether decreases
in liquidity could have been associated with changes in the role of bond nancing generally.
Based on data assembled from di¤erent sources (Federal Reserve, NBER and Guthman
(1950)) we show that bond nancing actually grew during the periods when trading volume
collapsed on the Exchange.
Second, we ask whether the drop in liquidity could have resulted from SEC regulations
increasing the cost of listing on the Exchange. We show that the decline in liquidity was
not correlated with a decline in listings. Furthermore, while Exchange trading disappeared
in securities that were exempt from the 1933 and 1934 acts (such as municipal bonds), it
remained active in securities which were subject to this regulation (most notably stocks).
A third possible explanation focuses on the interaction between classes of traders with
di¤erent preferences. It is widely recognized that there are positive externalities in liquidity
(see for example Admati and Peiderer (1988) and Pagano (1989)). Traders prefer to route
their orders where they expect to nd liquidity, i.e., where they expect the other investors to
have sent their orders. Complementarities can give rise to multiple equilibria. While each of
these equilibria can be locally stable, it can be upset by an exogenous shock, or a change in the
2The historical evolution of trading volume in municipal and corporate bonds is documented in the
present paper. The Treasury and Federal Study of the Government Securities Market, published in July
1959, mentions (Part I, page 95) that trading volume in Treasury securities migrated from the NYSE to the
OTC market during the rst half of the 1920s.
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characteristics of the players. Di¤erent equilibria will vary in terms of their attractiveness for
di¤erent categories of market participants. Intermediaries benet when liquidity concentrates
in venues where they earn rents, such as opaque and fragmented markets. For reasons we
will show were quite evident to observers at the time, large institutional investors fare better
than retail investors in a dealership market. This was especially true on the NYSE until 1975,
because commissions were regulated by the Constitution of the Exchange, while intermediary
compensation was fully negotiable on the OTC market. We nd that liquidity migrated
from the exchange to the OTC market at times when institutional investors and dealers
became more important relative to retail investors. As institutions and dealers became more
prevalent in bond trading, they tipped the balance in favor of the over-the-counter markets.
To evaluate the impact on trading costs, we collected high frequency data on transactions
and quotes for 6 corporate bonds from 1943 through 1947 and 6 municipal bonds between
1926 and 1930. We chose these dates because they bracket the periods during which liquidity
vanished from the Exchange for municipal bonds and then for corporate bonds. Average
transactions costs were substantially lower in the late 1920s for municipal bonds than they
are today. In the 1940s, despite xed commissions, costs for retail investors trading corporate
bonds were as low or lower than they are today in OTC markets. We believe this is quite
striking. The natural or potential liquidity of corporate and municipal bonds is unlikely to
have been higher historically than it is today, and the availability of counterparties is likely
to have improved, since a much larger portion of the population invests and the population
is much larger. More obviously, the cost of nding counterparties and processing trades
is likely to have decreased, given the improvements in communication and data processing
technology. These technological changes have dramatically reduced the costs of trading in
other sectors of the economy. For example, Jones (2002) shows that, starting in the 1980s,
bid-ask spreads and commissions declined persistently and signicantly.
Municipal bonds are a particularly interesting security to study in this context. The
interest on the bonds is tax-exempt, and retail investors are therefore a signicant presence
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in the market, as they are with equities. Migration of liquidity from the Exchange to the
OTC market is most costly for retail investors.3 Our high-frequency data shows there was a
striking drop in municipal bond trading on the NYSE in the late 1920s. At that time trading
volume in equities was soaring. The Exchange was desperately short of capacity. (See Davis,
Neal and White (2005).) The NYSE decided to reallocate capacity from relatively inactive
bonds towards stocks, which were more protable for the oor traders. Simultaneously, retail
investors, attracted to equities by the large recent returns, lost their appetite for municipal
bonds, leaving investment in this market to institutions. At this point, trading activity
in municipal bonds rapidly migrated to the OTC market. This experience illustrates how
shocks can lead to shifts in the focal point for trading. The di¢ culty of reversing such shifts
once they have occurred (even if the conditions triggering the shift change) is illustrated by
the inability of the Exchange to regain volume in municipal bonds, even when equity trading
dropped relative to bonds during the years of the Great Depression.
Several papers have shown empirically that, in the OTC bond market, investors can in-
cur large transactions costs, in particular for smaller trades. Green, Hollield, and Schürho¤
(2007b) show that, when municipal bonds are issued, there is a large amount of price dis-
persion and retail investors systematically buy at relatively high prices. Harris and Piwowar
(2006) write: Our results show that municipal bond trades are signicantly more expen-
sive than equivalent sized equity trades.That bonds command transactions costs, larger
than for stocks, is surprising. Risk is one of the main components of the cost of supplying
liquidity. Bonds are less risky than stocks. They should have lower spreads. The large
transaction costs paid by nal investors in the bond market could reect dealersmarket
power. Indeed, Green, Hollield, and Schürho¤ (2007a) nd that dealers in the municipal
bond market exercise substantial market power. In the corporate bond market, DiMaggio
et al (2016) nd that, when dealers trade with clients (as opposed to other dealers), they
3Bernhardt et al (2005) show theoretically that, in dealer markets, imperfect competition will lead to
greater transactions costs for retail trades, and o¤er empirical evidence that this was the case for equities on
the London Stock Exchange when it was a dealer market.
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charge an extra markup of about 50 basis points. But could transactions costs be lowered by
trading bonds in transparent centralized limit order market instead of a fragmented dealer
market? It is di¢ cult to answer that question without a counterfactual. While modern bond
markets dont o¤er such a counterfactual, historical experience does.4
In the next section we review the organization of the bond market in the 20th century.
Section 3 describes our data sources. Section 4 reviews long term trends in bond nancing
and investing and discusses their possible link with the migration of bond market liquidity
o¤ the exchanges. Sections 5 and 6 consider trading and trading costs for corporate bonds
in the 1940s and municipal bonds in the 1920s, respectively, using transactions data from
the NYSE. Section 6 o¤ers additional remarks on convertible bonds and stocks. Section 8
concludes.
2 The organization of bond trading in the 20th century
Corporate and municipal bonds have historically been available both on organized exchanges
and on over-the-counter markets, with the relative importance of these venues changing
over time. A few mechanical aspects of the trading process are similar across the di¤erent
venues. Prices on long-term bonds have traditionally been expressed as percentage of par,
with trading in eighths, except for Treasuries which trade in ner increments.5 In other
respects the trading process on the exchange di¤ers dramatically from its counterpart over-
the-counter. In this section we describe the mechanics of bond trading on the NYSE and
in the OTC market in the twentieth century. We also summarize the discussion by market
participants from the 20s to the 50s of the relative roles and merits of the two market venues.
Our sources for this information are the books and publications to which we had access at the
4An important source of exogenous variation showing the importance of market structure for bond trading
costs has been the introduction of post-trade transparency. Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein,
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2007) show that the improvement
in post-trade transparency associated with TRACE lowered trading costs. While TRACE introduced post-
trade transparency, limit order books involve both pre- and post-trade transparency.
5Today, corporate bond prices are decimalized.
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Archives of the NYSE.6 We also beneted from useful discussions with brokers who operated
in the bond market on the NYSE in the 1950s.
2.1 Bond trading on the NYSE
Since 1872, specialists have been responsible for providing liquidity and maintaining con-
tinuous prices for equities. In contrast, bond trading on the NYSE has always been purely
order-driven.The Exchange simply collects, posts and matches the orders of customers
and the brokers acting for them. The physical separation of bond from stock dealing took
place in 1902, when the so called bond crowdwas formed. Until the 1920s, bond trading
took place in the same room as stock trading. Trading in the bond cornerwas organized
around three booths in the North East corner of the Exchange (see Meeker, 1922). As trading
in bonds increased, it was allocated more and more space. In May, 1928, the bond room,
located at 20 Broad Street, and connected directly with the NYSE oor, was opened for
trading (NYSE Fact Book, 1938). This was part of a general program to increase capacity
on the exchange in response to the increases in volume in the 1920s (see Davis, Neal, and
White, 2005).
Investors trading on the Exchange must pay commissions to the brokers facilitating the
trade. Until 1975, commissions were regulated by the Governing Committee of the exchange.
Our intraday data on bond transactions comes from two periods, the 1920s for municipals
and the 1940s for corporates and commission rates di¤ered across these two periods. The
constitution of the NYSE, with amendments to November 25, 1927, states the commission
rates in its Article XIX. For bonds, the relevant rules are as follows:
Sec. 2. Commissions shall be as follows:
(a) On business for parties not members of the exchange... On Bonds: Not
less that $2.00 per $1,000 value.
6We are very grateful for the kind hospitality and help of the Archives department of the NYSE, especially
Steve Wheeler.
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(b) On business for members of the Exchange when a principal is not given
up... On bonds: Not less than 80 cents per $ 1,000 value.
(c) On business for members of the Exchange when a principal is given up...
On bonds: Not less than 40 cents per $ 1,000 value.
(d) On obligations of the United States, Porto Rico, Philippine Islands and
States, Territories and Municipalities therein... Such rates... as may be mutually
agreed upon.
Thus, commissions were already deregulated for Treasuries and municipal bonds in the
1920s. For the other bonds, commissions were regulated but were lower than for stocks. For
example, on stocks priced between $10 and $25, for parties not members of the exchange,
the minimum commission could not be less than 12.5 cents per share traded. Hence, for
the sale of 50 shares, at a unit price of $20, the commission would have to be above $6.25,
substantially above the $2 threshold prevailing for bonds.
By the 1940s, minimum commissions had risen. The commission schedule also made
explicit concessions for trade size. Table 1 shows the commission schedule prevailing in the
late 1940s, which we obtained from the NYSE archives. The minimum denomination of
the bonds was $1,000, and the body of the table gives the commission per $1,000 of par
value traded. For example, the second line of the top panel indicates that a non-member
purchasing three bonds with $1,000 par value at a price of $99 per $100 of par value would
pay a commission of $2.00 per bond, or $6.00 total.
Meeker (1922) and Shultz (1946), who were economists at the NYSE, o¤er very detailed
descriptions of the bond trading process on the exchange. Meeker (1922) explains that in
the bond corner trading in foreign bonds and Liberty Bonds was conducted in the two
smaller booths, while the other bonds were traded in the third, and largest, bond booth.
For the more recent period, Shultz (1946) explains that the bond roomwas divided in
four separate divisions: the active crowd, the inactive or bookor cabinet crowd,
the foreign crowd, and the Government securities crowd. Frequently-traded domestic bond
9
issues were assigned to the active crowd. Active bonds were traded on the open outcry oor
market. Meeker (1922, page 163) reports that:
In the case of market orders in the active bonds, whose prices are reported
on the right side of the quotation board, the broker after noting the latest price
on the board, goes directly to the bond crowd and e¤ects a sale at the most
favorable bid or asked price he can obtain.
Shultz (1946) o¤ers a detailed example of order placement and trading in the active
crowd:
Broker As telephone clerk on the oor receives an order over the direct tele-
phone wire from his o¢ ce to buy 5 Atchison General 4s of 1995 at 106. He makes
out a buyorder blank and hands it to his broker, who proceeds to bid for the
bonds in the crowd. There are no immediate sellers so Broker A leaves the center
of the crowd for the time being. The quotation clerk makes a notation to the
e¤ect that Broker A is bidding 106 for the bonds. Broker Bs telephone clerk
then receives an order from his o¢ ce to sell 3 Atchison General 4s at 106 1/4 . A
sellorder slip . . . is made out and handed to broker B, who o¤ers the bonds
in the crowd. The quotation clerk records on his slate that Broker B is o¤ering
Atchison General 4s at 106 1/4 . A short time later Broker Cs telephone clerk
gets a call from his o¢ ce for a quoteon Atchison General 4s. The quotation
clerk informs him that the market is 106 1/4 , 106 bid, o¤ered at 106 1/4 . The
telephone clerk relays this information back to his o¢ ce and shortly thereafter
receives an order to sell 10 bonds at 106. Broker C takes the sellorder slip,
enters the crowd and learns from the quotation clerk that Broker A is bidding
106 for the bonds. . . Broker A takes5 at 106 and broker C reduces his o¤er
to 5 Atchison General 4s at 106. The quotation clerk changes his record to show
the new o¤er and erases Broker As bid.
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The majority of the listed domestic bonds, however, were traded in the inactive, or
cabinet, crowd. In the inactive crowd, all orders were written on standard slips and led in
the bond cabinetsor ledgers.This was, in e¤ect, a limit-order book, collecting rm buy
and sell orders and enforcing time and price priority. Apart from the manual technology,
the workings of the bond cabinetare very similar to those of electronic order books in the
21st century, such as Euronext, Xetra, Sets, or Inet. Meeker (1922, page 161) writes:
Since most bonds are relatively inactive, the bid and asked quotations for
them are kept on the bond ledgers. . . Under the name of a given bond issue,
the clerk inscribes the various bid and ask quotations for it, as well as the amounts
of bonds to be purchased or sold and the initials of the various brokers and dealers
from whom he received the information. When these bid and ask quotations are
for any reason withdrawn by the bond men, they are erased from the ledger. A
bond man can thus learn the market for any inactive bond which he may desire
to purchase or to sell, by asking the ledger clerk.
Shultz (1946) provides a detailed illustration of the workings of the cabinet:
For example, Broker As clerk receives an order to sell 5 PeoplesGas, Light
and Coke 5s of 47 at 116. He makes out a sellorder slip and takes it to the
cabinet to which the particular bond issue is assigned. The order is handed to
a bond clerk,a Stock Exchange employee who les the order. . . Broker Bs
clerk then hands the bond clerk an order to sell 30 PeoplesGas, Light and Coke
5s of 47 at 116. This order is placed behind Broker As order, notwithstanding
the size of Broker Bs o¤er. Broker Cs clerk later enters a buyorder for the
same issue calling for 15 bonds at 115 3/4... The quotation would now be 115
3/4 - 116, 15 and 35... Broker D receives an order to buy 25 PeoplesGas 5s
at 116. Inasmuch as Broker A has priority as to time, his order for 5 bonds is
completely lled and broker B then sells 20 bonds to broker D.
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Once the trades had been completed, they were widely disseminated. Meeker (1922, page
161) explains that:
Reporters obtain the prices of sales as they occur in the bond crowd, make
out slips and pass them to the board boys, who at once post the prices on the
board - if the bond is one which is recorded there. Simultaneously they inform
the telegraph operator, and very shortly afterward the quotations appear on the
bond tickers throughout the country.
Thus, the bond market on the NYSE enjoyed a very high level of pre- and post-trade
transparency. All brokers could observe the book of available orders and the recent trades,
and inform their customers about them. In 1976, the NYSE introduced the Automated Bond
System, an electronic order book with full price and time priority. This system is still in use
today, but activity conned to a relatively small number of retail trades. More than 1000
bond issues are still listed on the Exchange, including Treasury bonds, Corporate bonds (e.g.,
General Motors), Utility bonds (Baby Bells), State bonds (e.g., State of California bonds),
and Municipal bonds (e.g., NYC bonds). In all these cases, however, the overwhelming
majority of trades are conducted over the counter.
2.2 The over-the-counter market
While many bonds are (and have traditionally been) exchange listed, many more are (and
have traditionally been) unlisted. Unlisted bonds trade over the counter, in a market based
on bilateral, informal contacts between dealers. Listed bonds have traditionally been traded
OTC as well as on the Exchange. Bond dealers typically maintain inventories in the securities
for which they make markets.A good description of the over-the-counter market at that
time is o¤ered in an investment analysis text published by an NYU professor in 1946:
The market in over-the-counter securities is made by dealers within and be-
tween their o¢ ces at prices established by individual negotiation, that is, through
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bid and ask prices... A dealer creates and maintains a market for any issue of
bonds or of stock by announcing openly to the other dealer and broker houses
that he stands ready both to buy and sell that security at the bid price and
the o¤ering price that he quotes to those who inquire... The securities houses
that act as dealers or brokers in the over-the-counter market include investment
banking houses, over-the-counter houses, municipal bond dealers, government
bond dealers, stock exchange rms which operate over-the-counter trading de-
partments, and dealer banks... A house that makes a market in an issue usually
maintains a positionin the security by trading (buying and selling) against its
position in the issue. It buys and sells for its own account and risk as principal...
Unlike exchanges, where sales in a particular security are concentrated at one
post on the exchange oor and the actual prices at which the security is sold are
reported, the over-the-counter market is unable to report all transactions in a
security. (Prime, 1946, pages 60 to 63.)
In contrast with the exchange, there are no explicit commissions in the over-the-counter
market. In the words of Gellermann (1957, page 104):
the price charged by the over-the-counter dealer will be a net price - no
mention will be made of a commission, but you can be sure that the equivalent
of a commission, or more, will be included in the price.
In addition to the regulation of commissions, a key di¤erence between the NYSE and the
OTC market lies in their relative transparency. On the Exchange orders and transactions
prices are recorded and made available to the public. On the OTC market, up to the very
recent past, the transactions prices were not recorded in any central location, nor were the
dealers under any obligation to disclose them. Transparency, however, is an endogenous
outcome. It would be premature to conclude that the institutional setting is the cause of
the lack of transparency. Both the trading venue and its transparency could be a response
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to a more fundamental lack of liquidity. If investors almost never wish to trade their bonds,
it may be economically wasteful to maintain the infrastructure to provide continuous price
quotations. On the other hand, investors may rarely trade their bonds because information
about prices is not available at low cost, or because they know the lack of transparency will
put them at an informational disadvantage in negotiating terms of trade.
2.3 Contemporary views of the merits of alternative trading venues
Even listed bonds have traditionally also been traded over the counter. The trading of
Treasury bonds, which historically had occurred on the Exchange, migrated to the OTC
dealer market in the twenties. Migration of the trading of corporate bonds occurred later,
during the 1940s. This development is illustrated in Figure 1. Panel A plots bond turnover
on the NYSE per year. Bond volume peaked in the 1920s and 1930s, fell dramatically in
the 1940s, and then rose moderately in the 1960s before tailing o¤ to negligible amounts in
recent years. (The increase in the 1960s was largely due to the popularity convertible bonds
traded on the exchange enjoyed with retail investors during this period: see our discussion
below in Section 7.) Panel B illustrates that relative to the volume in equities, the drop
in bond volume in the 1940s was even more dramatic. Bond volume rose to over 30% of
stock volume during the depression years, fell precipitously in the 1940s, and has continued
a steady decline since then. Contemporary observers were aware of these trends. As early
as 1946, an investments textbook mentioned that:
Prominent among the issues that are traded both on an exchange and over-
the-counter are United States Treasury bonds and such instrumentalities as Fed-
eral Farm Mortgage Corporations and Home Owners Loan Corporation issues.
The volume of trading in these issues, especially Treasury bonds, in the over-
the-counter market ordinarily exceeds that on the exchanges. (Prime, 1946, page
59.)
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A few pages later in the same book, we nd, Stocks are bought and sold primarily
through the exchanges; bonds are usually bought and sold over the counter (Prime, 1946,
page 65). Along the same lines, P. Shultz concluded his book with a list of open issues,
including the following question, What is to be done about bond trading, only 10 per cent
of which is now done on the exchange and the rest over-the-counter?(Shultz, 1946)
A book written in the 1950s by an investment banker, noted that:
The major, and often the only, market for state, county, city, town, and village
bonds as well as the increasing number of obligations issued by the so-called
authorities is also the overthe-counter market... Corporate bonds industrial,
rail, and utility are frequently traded over-the-counter even though such issues
are listed on an exchange. (Gellermann, 1957, pages 102 and 103).
Contemporary observers show a clear understanding of the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of exchange and OTC trading for di¤erent market participants. In the thirties,
it seems to have been recognized that exchange listing was associated with greater liquidity,
the ability to trade cheaply and quickly without moving the price. The Confessions of a
Bond Salesman, published in 1932, concludes a chapter (page 19) as follows:
He who is likely to need quickly to turn his capital into cash - and what
investor is not - should, by all means, buy listed securities, or securities whose
market is based upon the listed market.
Even Lawrence Chamberlain, who was a senior manager of a Bond House, conducting
trading in the OTC market, and a vocal advocate of the latter system, writes that, It is
unquestionably true that the average listed bond can be more readily sold or hypothecated
than the average unlisted.(Chamberlain, 1925, page 63) On the other hand, Chamberlain
described the OTC market as a signicant competitor of the exchange, already in the 1920s:
The great system of American bond houses... is really an immense exchange
in itself, reaching out with its branch o¢ ces and traveling representatives over
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the more settled parts of the United States and Canada. This system, with the
aid of telegraph and telephone, fulls for most purposes the legitimate functions
of an investment exchange. There is of course no similar system for stocks.
(Chamberlain, 1925, page 66.)
Market participants and observers were also aware that di¤erent trading venues were
preferable for di¤erent types of investors. In his 1946 investment analysis textbook, NYU
professor John Prime wrote:
Some securities have certain features that make them especially adaptable to
trading in the over-the-counter market. Among those features [is the] eligibility
for purchase by banks and insurance companies... Institutional investors such as
banks and insurance companies usually buy and sell securities in large blocks...
They desire to avoid a public record of large purchases or sales of bonds because
of the adverse e¤ect such a transaction may have on the market price of such
issues... Furthermore, since a large buying order on the Exchange at a limited
price must give precedence to all orders having priority at that price, the institu-
tional order would experience di¢ culty in completion at the limited price. The
over-the-counter-dealer is in a better position to provide this service than the
stock exchange broker. (Prime, 1946, page 66.)
In addition, on the OTC market, and especially for large blocks, institutions could nego-
tiate the compensation of the intermediary. In contrast, on the exchange, commissions were
regulated, and could not be negotiated. Furthermore, the professionalized management and
relatively frequent presence in the market of institutions makes transparency less important
to them than to less sophisticated small investors who trade infrequently. The repeated
interaction that dealers and institutions have with each other renders them less vulnerable
to the opportunities which a lack of transparency a¤ords other participants to prot at their
expense on a one-time basis.
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Smaller institutions and individuals, for the opposite reasons, will tend to fare better in
an exchange-based trading regime. Indeed, the theoretical model of Bernhardt et al (2005)
shows that, in a dealer market, large institutions will trade more frequently and in larger
amounts than retail investors, and incur lower transactions costs.7 Gellerman, who was an
investment banker, mentions the disadvantages of this market for small investors:
There is no record of transactions in the over-the-counter market, which puts
the individual investor at a strong disadvantage. The professional or institutional
investor can transact business with an over-the-counter rm on some basis of
equality, but the individual is more or less forced to rely on the integrity of the
rm with which it is dealing. Almost all over-the-counter rms are members of
the National Association of Securities Dealers, which has regulatory authority
over its members. NASD has never ruled on what it considers a reasonable prot
on a purchase or sale by one of its members, but is known to favor between 3 and
5 per cent. There have been some startling deviations from this policy, however.
(Gellermann, 1957, pages 104 and 105.)
3 Data
We use aggregate series from various sources to document the broad features of the bond
markets evolution, and we supplement this with high-frequency data from historical and
modern sources.
3.1 Aggregate series
Hickman (1960) provides data on the total par amount of outstanding corporate bond issues
between 1900 and 1944. He also documents which of these issues are listed on the NYSE
7Bernhardt et al (2005) also o¤er an interesting empirical illustration of these e¤ects in the case of the
London Stock Exchange.
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and which are not. The latter are mostly private issues, traded over-the-counter. Hickman
(1960) provides no information on Treasuries or Municipal bonds, however.
The Federal Reserve Bank8 provides yearly time series, dating back to 1944, from the
ow of funds statistics. That includes the total amount of outstanding bonds, categorized
by type of issuers (Treasury, Municipal, Corporate), as well as information on who holds
these bonds. However, it does not document whether these bonds were listed on the NYSE
or not.
Guthman (1950) provides information on the total amount of bonds outstanding between
1920 and 1948. He categorizes these bonds by issuer type (Treasuries, Corporate, Munis).
He also gives information on who held these bonds, but does not document whether the
bonds were listed on the NYSE.
Historical data on the total amount of outstanding listed bond issues and on Exchange-
trading volume is available through the NYSE factbook on line9 for bond issues listed on
the NYSE, often dating back to the rst half of the 20th century. This source does not
categorize these bonds by type of issuer. Trading in Treasury bonds, however, migrated o¤
the Exchange in the early twenties, and turnover in municipal bonds has always been much
lower than in corporate bonds. Thus, from the mid-twenties on, aggregate bond trading
volume on the NYSE consists primarily of corporate bonds.
There are no historical data available on trading volume in the OTC market. Until very
recently, trades conducted over the counter were not compiled in a central source, or reported
to the investing public and regulatory authorities.
3.2 High-frequency trades & quotes
Throughout the 20th century, the Exchange has been supplying data on all trades and daily
quotes to a vendor, Francis Emory Fitch, that compiled and reported it on a daily basis.
Data on trades and quotes were also reported, on a weekly basis, in the Commercial &
8See www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
9See www.nysedata.com/factbook.
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Financial Chronicle. Thanks to the hospitality of the NYSE achives, we manually collected
Francis Emory Fitch and Commercial & Financial Chronicle data on Exchange trades and
quotes for municipal bonds from 1926 to 1930 and corporate bonds from 1943 to 1948. These
sample periods bracket the periods during which bond trading migrated from the NYSE to
the OTC market, and thus allow us to observe periods of both high and low liquidity.
For each transaction, Francis Emory Fitch reports the trading day, the transaction price
and the quantity traded. Francis Emory Fitch also reports the bid and ask quotes observed
at 11:00 a.m. The Commercial & Financial Chronicle reports quotes as well as the highest
and lowest transaction price during the week and the total quantity traded that week. On
weeks without trades, the Chronicle reported the price and month of the last trade.
Through the 1920s the NYSE made a market in sixteen long-term New York City munic-
ipal bonds. New York municipals were at that time, and still are, among the most actively
traded municipal bonds. All the bonds had initially been issued with a maturity of 50 years.
We collected data for a representative sub-sample of 6 New York City municipal bonds, dur-
ing 292 trading days from 1926 to 1930. From July 1, 1926 to December 31, 1927 and from
July 1, 1928 to March 31, 1930, we collected data from Francis Emory Fitch on each and
every trade conducted on the Exchange in these 6 bonds. The Francis Emory Fitch data was
unfortunately not available at the NYSE Archives for the rst 6 months of 1928. For that
period, we relied only on the Commercial & Financial Chronicle. Thus for that subperiod,
we observe only the highest and lowest price and total traded quantity. For the large ma-
jority of the weeks, this is not a limitation, however, as there is no more than one trade per
week. For the periods for which both data sources are available, we checked that the data
reported by the Commercial & Financial Chronicle were consistent with those reported by
Francis Emory Fitch. For the rst year of the sample (July 1, 1926 to June 30, 1927), we
have also collected the bid and ask quotes on days without transactions. To illustrate the
nature of this data, Figure 2 plots the time series of bid and ask quotes and transactions
prices from January 3 to June 30, 1927 for one the six New York City municipal bonds in
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our sample (NYC municipal bond, maturing 1957, coupon 4.5).
The majority of trades in bonds on the Exchange occurred at the best quotes or between
them. The latter case corresponds to the situation where the brokers of the buyer and the
seller meet on the oor and agree on a transaction price within the quotes. In that case, the
price impact (dened as the absolute value of the di¤erence between the transaction price
and the mid-quote, divided by the latter) is lower than half the spread. There are also some
trades outside of the best quotes. In a limit-order book, trading away from the best quotes
arises naturally when the size of the trade exceeds the depth at the quotes, and the order
walks up or down the book. It can also occur when the quoted spreads, which are recorded
at 11 a.m. each morning, become stale. For the corporate bonds in our sample, 77% of
the trades occur within the quoted spread for that day. The municipals trade within the
recorded spread 88% of the time.
We collected trades and quotes from Francis Emory Fitch for 6 corporate bonds from
the beginning 1943 to the end of 1947. Three of these bonds were railroad bonds, B&O
Railroads, Great Northern Railroads, and Hudson & Manhattan Railroads. Railroad bonds
accounted for a large share of the trading activity in the market. The remaining three bonds
were issued by American Tobacco, Firestone Rubber, and Saguenay Power. We picked these
six bonds because trades and quotes data were available for them throughout our sample
period. While our sample is small, it contains bonds that are typical of the market at that
time. The high-frequency corporate bond data includes 19,049 transactions, and bid-ask
quotes for 8,284 bond-day pairs. Close to half (45%) of the trades are for one or for two
bonds, with par value $1,000, but we have trades as large as 200 and 300 bonds in American
Tobacco during 1943. From 1943 to 2003 the CPI increased by 10.6 times, so a $300 thousand
dollar trade corresponds to over $3 million today.
The data were originally manually recorded and contain clerical errors. We eliminated
from our sample bond-days for which one side of the bid-ask spread was missing, or for which
the quoted spread was negative or exceeded 50% of the price. In a small number of cases we
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corrected transcription errors where a decimal was misplaced or the bid and ask price were
inverted, if it were obvious from the surrounding prices and quotes that such an error had
been made.
One of our goals is to compare the costs of trading bonds today, in the OTCmarket, to the
costs of trading bonds historically on the exchange. To make this comparison for corporate
bonds we rely on summary statistics from modern studies of trading costs that in turn rely
on the TRACE data base. For municipal bonds a sample of trades in 39 modern bonds,
during the period 2000-2005, was gathered from the web site Investinbonds.com.This web
site reports historical transactions in municipal bonds gathered by the Municipal Securities
Rule Making Board (MSRB), and combines these transactions data with information on the
bonds, such as credit ratings, obtained from other data vendors.10 The MSRB data identify
trades as customer purchases, customer sales, or interdealer trades.
4 Long term trends in bond investing and nancing
In this section we survey long term trends in bond investing and nancing and discuss
whether they could have caused the demise of exchange-based bond trading.
4.1 Bond nancing through the 20th century
The decline in bond trading on the exchange has occurred despite broad increases in the
supply of bonds outstanding in all sectors. Figure 3 combines data from di¤erent sources
(Guthman, 1950, Hickman, 1960 and The Flow of Funds compiled by the Federal Reserve
Bank) to show increases in par value outstanding from 1920 to 2002 for Treasury, municipal,
and corporate bonds. To ensure comparability all the gures are in 2002 dollars, using the
10The MSRB began requiring all registered broker dealers to report transactions in municipal bonds to
them beginning in May of 2000. The data was initially made available to the public with a 30-day lag, unless
the bond traded more than four times in a day, in which case it was reported with a one-day lag. Through
a series of steps, the MSRB has moved to more timely reporting. In 2005 transactions were reported 15
minutes after execution.
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Consumer Price Index. There is a steady geometric increase in corporate bonds outstanding
(in real terms), reecting economy-wide growth in economic activity and new investment
in the corporate sector.11 Both municipal and federal debt show more variable growth
rates, reecting the cycles in government surpluses and decits. Treasury debt jumped
dramatically in the early 1940s to nance the war e¤ort. Both municipal and federal debt
slightly decreased in real terms in the 1990s because of government surpluses.
Comparing Figure 3 to Figure 1, it is clear that changes in trading volume on the Ex-
change are not explained by changes in the supply of bonds. There is no evidence of a drop
in debt nancing in the 1940s, which was the period when the drop in volume is most strik-
ing. Bond trading volume on the Exchange largely disappeared in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet
this was a period when U.S. corporations favoured debt over equity, as shown, for example,
in Rajan and Zingales (1995). Debt outstanding grew by more than net new investment,
because rms nanced repurchases of shares with debt.
4.2 Regulatory and disclosure costs
Could bond trading have dropped on the exchange in the 1940s because bond listings
declined, in response to the regulatory requirements associated with New Deal security leg-
islation?12 The Securities Act of 1933, which is concerned with the initial distribution of
securities, requires that securities o¤ered to the public be registered with the SEC. The
registration statement must contain specic information about the security, the issuer, and
the underwriters. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which is concerned with secondary
trading, states that no security may be listed on an exchange unless its issuer les an appli-
cation for registration containing much the same information as is required by the 1933 Act.
This information must be kept current by the ling of annual and other reports with the
11This increase also reects the nancial choices of US corporations in the 2 postwar decades, during
which debt increased from 15 to 30% of corporate nancing, while the use of equity declined from 5 to 2%
of corporate nancing (see White, 2000, page 777).
12For a description of this regulatory framework, see Loss and Seligman, 1998, in particular Volume I,
pages 225 and 226. See also White, 2000.
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exchange and the SEC. Securities that are not listed on an exchange are not subject to these
provisions. The regulatory burden associated with public trading and exchange listing could
have encouraged private placement leading to a decrease in trading volume on the exchange.
In light of this hypothesis, consider Figure 4, which plots the time series of the number
of bond issues listed on the NYSE between 1925 and 2003.13 To shed some light on the
relation between this variable and trading volume on the exchange, we also plot on the same
graph the time series of bond trading volume on the NYSE. The trading volume gures
are expressed in 2003 dollars, using the Consumer Price index. Figure 4 shows no evident
association between the bond volume and bond listings on the exchange. Bond trading
volume was at its peak in the mid 1930s, when the number of bonds listed was slightly lower
than 1600. The number of bonds listed was at its peak in 1986, with 3856 issues listed,
and yet bond trading volume on the exchange was very limited at this point in time. It
seems implausible, then, to attribute the drop in bond trading volume on the Exchange to
increased listing costs associated with the New Deal securities legislation.
4.3 The balance of trading clienteles
Liquidity attracts liquidity. There are obvious positive externalities in trading. Once a
trading venue becomes a focal point for trading, it is di¢ cult to move trading elsewhere
because of the coordination problems involved. The rst defectors from the status quo will
have no one to trade with, unless they can bring large numbers of other participants with
them. Thus, there are forces that will lead traders of di¤erent types to cluster in the same
market, as shown by Admati and Peiderer (1988).
Over-the-counter and exchange-based bond trading coexisted for decades in the 20th
century with viable levels of activity in each setting. What upset this balance? Was the
migration to the OTC market triggered by changes in the structure of the population of bond
investors? Combining Guthman (1950) and data from the Fed, we present in Figure 5 the
13This series was obtained from the NYSE factbook on line: www.nysedata.com/factbook.
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evolution of bond ownership between 1920 and 2004.14 As can be seen in Panel A, there was
a dramatic increase in institutional ownership in corporate bonds between 1940 and 1960.
In the 1940s the weight and importance of institutional investors in the bond market grew
tremendously. These investors came to amount for the majority of the trading activity in
the bond market. It was natural for them to direct their trades to the OTC market, where
they could e¤ectively exploit their bargaining power, without being hindered by reporting
and price priority constraints, and where they could avoid the regulated commissions which
prevailed on the Exchange.
5 Municipal bond markets in the 1920s and nowadays
5.1 Trading municipal bonds in the 1920s
5.1.1 The collapse in municipal bond trading on the NYSE
Trading in municipals on the NYSE collapsed at the beginning of 1929. Figure 6, Panel A,
displays monthly trading volume on the NYSE for the six NYC municipal bonds, measured
in number of lots traded. Panel B plots the average price impact of trades. The market was
quite active in 1926 and 1927, and price impact rather low (below 50 basis points). Towards
the end of the period, however, liquidity, whether measured by the cost of trading or the
amount of trading, collapsed in a remarkably short period of time. As can be seen in Panel
A, volume collapsed in February 1929. Panel B shows that price impact had been rising since
August 1928. While it had remained below 0.5% until July, it approached 1% in August.
After February, it ranged between 1.5% and 2.5%. Through March of 1930, Francis Emory
Fitch continued to report some quotes for Municipal bonds, and a few rare trades. After
14The fraction of the bonds owned by di¤erent categories of investors is depicted on the vertical axis.
For the period before 1945, we only have the total amount and the amount owned by insurance companies,
banks and savings institutions. For the period following 1945, we have data on all categories of owners. The
percentages on the gure do not add up to one because we have not depicted certain categories of investors.
For example, foreign corporate bond ownership, which has become important in the recent years, is not
depicted in the gure.
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April of 1930, liquidity had permanently vanished. Francis Emory Fitch had no longer any
quote or trade data to report for municipal bonds. We veried that this continued through
the end of the decade. In January 1933, October 1936, and October 1939, for example, there
were no trades and no quotes whatsoever. Thus trading in municipal bonds disappeared on
the Exchange long before corporate bond trading declined. Why such a sudden collapse?
Municipal bond volume migrated o¤ the exchange because of a convergence of factors, which
we now examine in turn.
5.1.2 Bond trading vs stock trading
The surge in stock trading in the late 1920s raised the prots of members but strained
capacity. Bond volume on the exchange was at in the 1920s, in contrast to stock volume.
Figure 7 uses data published January 3, 1929 in the Wall Street Journal, and shows bond
volume (par value), stock volume (shares traded) and exchange seat prices (midpoint between
the high and low dollar values) from 1890 to 1929. Each series is normalized by its value in
1890, to emphasize the relative growth rates. Prior to 1920, bond volume and stock volume
trended upward together, along with seat prices. For example, from 1918 to 1919 all three
roughly doubled. Bond volume peaked in 1922, but stock volume shot up dramatically in
the boom of the late 1920s.
The increase in stock trading activity raised the prots of the members of the Exchange.
Figure 7 shows that seat prices (which reect the expectation of the capitalized prots of
the members) tend to follow stock volume when growth in stock volume and bond volume
depart. The marginal seat price was, apparently, driven by activity in stocks, not bonds. A
regression of the percentage change in the normalized seat price against percentage changes
in normalized bond and stock volumes yields an adjusted R2 of 43%. The coe¢ cient of stock
volume is signicantly positive with a t-statistic of 5.28, while that of bond volume is not
signicantly di¤erent from 0. Given the strong public demand for investing in stocks, and the
commission rates described in Section II, stock trading was more protable for brokers than
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bond trading. While the increase in stock trading activity raised the prots of members, it
also strained capacity. An article in the Wall Street Journal from 1929 states:
Since the speculative phase in stocks set in April, last, the physical and me-
chanical facilities of the Exchange have been taxed to capacity and, notwith-
standing many improvements made for faster service, the ticker service during
many sessions proved to be unable to keep abreast of the actual sales made on
the oor, especially during the 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 share days. (January 3,
p. 31)
Davis, Neal and White (2005) chronicle the exchanges attempts to increase capacity in
response to the dramatic increases in volume. On several days during 1928, the exchange had
to close following a day of unprecedented trading volume. It eventually declared a quarter-
seat dividend to all existing members, in order to increase the number of seats available and
thus the number of people allowed to trade on the oor.
Second, in response to these capacity problems the Exchange allocated trading capacity
away from bonds and towards equities. The reallocation of resources to stocks is reected
in the minutes of the Committee on Arrangements of the NYSE through the early part of
1929. In the minutes of January 3, for example, the committee approved allowing Arthur
E. French & Co. to have a telephone space in sections WA and WB in the bond crowd,
for stock business.The committee approved a similar proposal for another member rm
on January 8, and also referred to two individual members the matter of removing the
Inactive Stock Crowd to the bond room.In the January 15 meeting, one of those individuals,
M. Mills, reported progress with reference to the location of post 30 in the bond room.
There then follows, in February and March, a series of approvals of changes of location,
moving 16 individual preferred stocks and two common stocks to Post 30 from other posts.
Examples of these entries are: March 26, Request of Arthur A. Zucker to move Filenes
sons company 6% cumulative preferred to post 30, e¤ective April 1, 1929, was approved.
April 2, The committee approved the request ... that the Common Stock of the Nickels
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Holding Corporation be moved from post 14 to post 30. These changes involved costly
adjustments to infrastructure, and so were not trivial decisions. On March 12, for example,
the minutes report: The committee directed that Post 30 be removed to the Southerly Bond
Crowd Room as soon as a separate tube station relay can be provided...As soon as post 30
is moved, telephone booths are to be placed in the space now occupied by that post.
5.1.3 Institutions vs retail investors
Another factor was that in the late 1920s institutions became relatively more important
than retail investors in municipal bonds. As retail investors were attracted by the dramatic
appreciation in equities, they lost interest in less exciting securities, which they had held
traditionally, such as municipal bonds. The New York Times states in late January, 1929:
Since municipalities in various parts of the country have found, to their cha-
grin, that they cannot borrow at nearly as advantageous rates this year as last,
the charge is made in many quarters that the stock market is directly responsible.
In other words, an investor will not take a municipal bond at 4 per cent if he sees
an opportunity to double his money in the stock market. (NYT, Jan. 31, 1929,
Topics in Wall Street,p. 29.)
This left institutions as the major players in the municipal market. For example, near the
end of January 1929 the New York Times reported, There were probably fewer municipal
bonds sold at retail this week than in any week since December. Insurance companies and
institutions did what little buying was noted.(NYT, Jan. 26, 1929, $21,488,121 Sought
by Municipalities.) In early February the Times stated:
The municipal bond market this week has been extremely quiet, though most
of the new o¤erings have been fairly well received. Institutions continue to furnish
most of the buying power, and, in addition to the new o¤erings, have been called
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upon to absorb various blocks of old issues which have been brought out of
retirement. (NYT, Feb. 2, 1929, 58 Loans Sought by Municipalities,p. 27.)
As discussed above, while retail investors tend to be hurt by OTC trading, institutions
can benet from it. Hence, the investors active in municipal bonds in the late 1920s were
naturally attracted by the OTC market.
5.1.4 Long term consequences
These several factors booming demand for high margin stock trading services, at demand
for lower margin bond trading services, waning interest in municipal bonds from the retail
clienteles which the Exchange serves best, and reduction by the Exchange of the resources
available for bond trading combine to provide a circumstantial case that Exchange trading
in municipal bonds dried up in early 1929 because oor traders had more protable activities
to pursue while institutions, which had become the main players in this market, naturally
gravitated to OTC trading. As it turned out, of course, the boom in equity volume was short-
lived. Yet municipal bond volume never returned to the Exchange. This irreversibility is not
surprising, due to the positive externalities associated with liquidity, and the coordination
problems in moving volume from one venue to another. Concerned with the competition of
the OTC market, in the mid 1930s the Exchange introduced the nine bond rule:
The Committee has recently ruled that members must seek a market on the
Exchange in certain bonds before executing orders for less than 10 bonds else-
where. This rule is likewise intended to give the public the full benet of the
existing market and it is hoped that eventually it will result in bringing to the
Exchange a larger portion of the business in listed bonds which is now done over
the counter. (New York Stock Exchange Committee on Bonds: Report to the
Governing Committee. May 12, 1936).
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While this rule may have had some e¤ect in corporate bonds, it did not result in a revival
of municipals trading on the Exchange.
5.2 Trading and trading costs in the historical sample and the
modern one
Next, we compare the costs of trading municipal bonds at a time when they traded actively
on the NYSE with their recent counterparts in dealer markets. The 6 bonds in the historical
sample are New York City municipals. All six of these bonds were seasonedduring the
sample period. They had all been issued more than ten years previously. They were all
very long maturity, having been issued with a maturity of 50 years. Tables 2 and 3 report
descriptive information and summary statistics for our historical sample of municipal bonds
while Table 4 reports similar statistics for modern New York municipal bonds.
New York bonds are among the most liquid municipal bonds in the modern market for
several reasons. Because New York has high state income taxes, and only New York issues
qualify as tax-exempt for New York state income tax, New York residents understandably fa-
vor New York bonds. The state also has many high-income residents, with high marginal tax
rates, who are attracted to municipals. It is also a state with a large population. Thus, the
bonds in Table 4 trade relatively frequently when compared to the population of municipal
bonds.
The modern environment does not o¤er a set of municipal bonds with maturities as long
as the bonds from the 1920s. Municipal bonds today are typically issued in series.A single
underwriting includes a range of maturities up to 20-30 years. Most long-term municipals are
also callable. Therefore, by the time most of the bonds have ve to ten years of seasoning,
they are often close to their call date. All the bonds we have selected have more than ve
years of seasoning. Nevertheless, it is obvious from inspection of the table that the modern
bonds typically trade with greater frequency than did the New York City bonds during
1926-1928.
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For the modern sample, we do not have quoted spreads. Trading is quite infrequent,
however, and most trades can be matched with o¤setting transactions that clear dealer in-
ventories. Trades in seasoned bonds are usually initiated with a sale by a customer to a
dealer. We select all customer sales followed by customer purchases that add up in par
value to the initial sale, with no intervening transactions. Our measure of trading cost is the
realized dealer markup,the percentage return earned by the dealer on the round-trip trans-
action, which is comparable to a bid-ask spread. Green, Hollield, and Schürho¤ (2007a)
apply other trade matching methods, such as a rst-in-rst-out rule, and nd that they
yield similar measure of trading costs. Harris and Pirowar (2006) use time-series methods to
estimate e¤ective spreads for the bonds that experienced more than four trades during their
sample period, and nd average retail trading costs of the same order of magnitude.
Both Green, Hollield, and Schürho¤ (2007a) and Harris and Pirowar (2006) show that
trading costs for bonds in the OTC markets fall dramatically with trade size. Edwards, Har-
ris, and Piwowar (2007) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) show this also holds for
corporate bonds.15 In contrast, as Table 3 shows, percentage price impact is not decreasing
in trade size for the historical sample. In the next section, we will see that corporate bonds
in the 1940s exhibit similar behavior.
Comparison of Tables 2 and 4 reveals that average trading costs are lower in the historical
sample than in the modern one. The average dealer markup across all the bonds in the
modern sample is 2.4%. Note that this average includes both retail- and institutional-sized
trades. For the municipals trading on the NYSE in 1926-1928, the average percentage bid-ask
spread was 0.59%. The average price impact was 0.245%. As discussed earlier, traders had
to pay commissions on the exchange. A generous estimate of the magnitude for a commission
would be $2 for a $1000 trade. Even after adding the corresponding round-trip commission
of 0.4% to the average bid-ask spread, our ndings suggest that transactions costs for retail
investors in the municipal bond market in the 1920s were less than half what they are now.
15This behavior contrasts with that observed in equity limit order markets, in which price impact increases
in trade size. See Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2005), section 1.2, for a survey of this evidence.
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It is not likely that other di¤erences between our modern and historical samples are
driving the result:
 The municipal bonds in our modern sample tend to have shorter duration than those
in our historical sample. Other things equal, shorter duration tends to reduce risk,
which should reduce spread.16
 The majority of the bonds in our modern sample trade with greater frequency than
those in our historical sample. More frequent trading should reduce spreads.
 The greater transactions costs observed in the contemporary bond sample cannot reect
greater default risk since all the contemporary bonds in our sample are insured or AAA.
To gain a better sense of the patterns of transactions costs and trading activity in the
historical and contemporary samples, we ran the following regression across the bonds in our
modern sample:
(Mean markup)i = b0 + b1(Mean days with trade)i + b2(Mean yearly volume)i + ei
where i = 1; :::; 39 indicates the bond. The parameter estimates are b0 = 2:615 (t = 13:822),
b1 =  0:0122 (t =  2:040) and b2 = 0:0007 (t = 2:274). Using these estimates, we predict
the mean markup on a modern bond with the same annual trading frequency and volume
as the bonds trading in 1926-1927. The volume is adjusted to the 2003 price level. Table
5 displays the resulting tted values for the trading markup for each bond, along with the
di¤erence between it and the average bid-ask spread plus round trip commission on the
NYSE in the 1920s. The average di¤erence is -1.37%. The average tted value based on
the modern data is 2.4 times higher than the average trading costs in 1926-1930. Clearly,
since we regress prices on quantities, this cannot be interpreted structurally, or in terms of
16Our sample of modern municipals are very seasoned, and hence might have higher costs than other
bonds. Yet, for a large sample of municipal bonds, Harris and Piwowar (2006) nd that e¤ective spreads
in the municipal bond market for retail-size trades average 2%, which is close to our estimate of 2.45% for
markups.
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causality. It does, however, reinforce the view that the patterns of transactions costs and
trading activity are very di¤erent in the contemporary and historical samples.
5.3 Consequences for investorswelfare
Large transactions costs for retail traders in the municipal bond market have a signicant
impact on investors welfare since, because municipal bonds are mostly held by individual
investors, as can be seen in Figure 5, Panel B. Individualsshare of municipal bond holdings
did not decrease throughout the century. The tax-exempt status of municipal bonds makes
them relatively attractive for individual investors, and tax rates rose over the course of the
century, from the imposition of the income tax in the Wilson administration, through the
New Deal and WWII, until they began to fall in the 1980s.17
6 Corporate Bond Trading and Trading Costs in the
1940s
Figure 1 shows that bond trading activity dropped on the Exchange in the mid-forties. Our
high-frequency data enables us to provide a more detailed picture of this drop. Table 6 shows
the number of trades and average trade size on the NYSE by year, from 1943 to 1947, for the
six corporate issues in our sample. In 1943 and 1944, trading activity was relatively high.
There were on average 823 trades per bond issue each year, which is over two transactions
per trading day. The trading frequency observed in the modern OTC corporate bond market
has been documented in modern studies. Using TRACE data Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri
(2007) observe on average 1.1 trade per day, and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) around
17While individuals have always had an important presence in the municipal market, Figure 5.B shows
the composition of institutional holders changed dramatically in the 1980s. The share of municipals held by
banks dropped dramatically, while that of mutual funds rose to o¤set this drop. This reects changes in the
tax law that limited the ability of commercial banks to deduct interest liabilities used to nance holdings of
municipals. (See Feldstein, Fabozzi, and Fabozzi (1995), p. 178.) The ability to engage in this quasi-tax-
arbitrage obviously made municipal bonds especially attractive to banks. Mutual funds, in contrast, simply
pass the tax-exempt treatment of the bonds through to the mutual-fund shareholder.
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2.0 trades per day. While our historical sample is far from comprehensive, this suggests that
in terms of number of trades, the limit-order book on the NYSE was able to support volumes
not below those for modern OTC bond markets.
From 1945 on trading activity declined, but this behavior was not uniform across bonds.
The decrease in number of trades was not o¤set by increases in trade size. Average trade size
also decreased throughout the sample period. Overall, while there was a drop in corporate
bond liquidity on the NYSE between 1943 and 1947, it was not as sudden or dramatic as
that which occurred for municipal trading in the 1920s.
For the corporate bonds in our sample, Table 7 reports, by year, average percentage
quoted bid-ask spreads, price impact and trade size. The percentage quoted spreads show
a clear tendency to increase across years, and are particularly high in 1947. This tendency
is also evident in the price impact, though with less uniformity across bonds. In Table 8 we
report mean and median price impact across all bonds in our sample, stratied by trade size
(columns 3 and 4). Price impact appears to be at across trades of di¤erent sizes.
To measure total transactions costs, commissions must be added to price impact. For
each transaction in our data set, we computed the commission using the top panel of Table 1,
business for non-members.Since commissions are larger, on average, than market impact,
and since they fall with trade size, the total transaction costs fall with trade size. In Table
8 we also report total one-way costs for trades in our data set of a xed size. Trading costs
decline initially, but quickly level o¤ in size.
The one-way costs for retail-sized trades are similar in magnitude to estimates from
modern data, but they are higher for large trades. For example, Edwards, Harris, and
Piwowar (2007) report18 estimates of mean (median) one-way costs of 75 (60) basis points
for trades of $5,000 and of 71 (56) for trades of $10,000 par value. Their sample includes all
21,973 TRACE bonds from January 2003 to January of 2005. The estimated costs decline
steadily with trade size to less than ve basis points for trades of over $2 million. Goldstein,
18See Table IV in Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007).
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Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) study 4,888 BBB bonds from July 2002 to February 2004, and
estimate mean (median) one-way costs of 118 (113) basis points for trades involving less
than $10 thousand and 109 (100) basis points for trades between $11 and $20 thousand.
The average costs then fall to 25 (15) basis points for trades in excess of $1 million.19 The
average trading costs in our sample are between those reported by these two papers for small
trades, and fall by less as trade size grows. Thus, despite the relatively high commissions
prevailing in the 1940s, and the stress the corporate bond market was under at the time,
trading costs for retail investors were roughly as low as they are in todays bond market.
To better understand the relationship between trade size and trading costs, in Table 9
we report regressions, with and without bond-specic xed e¤ects. The regressors are days
from January 1, 1943 and the natural log of trade size. In the rst two columns of the
table, the dependent variable is the price impact as a fraction of the midpoint, measured in
basis points, and in the last two columns the dependent variable is total one-way cost. Price
impact and one-way total costs increase in the number of days since 1943, reecting declining
liquidity. Price impact increases in trade size, while total one-way cost decreases modestly
with trade size. These results are quite robust to controlling for heterogeneity across bonds
through xed e¤ects.
As in the case of municipal bonds, the relationship between trading costs and trade size
is much atter in the historical exchange data than in the modern samples. Bernhardt et al
(2005) also nd that transactions costs decreased with size for equities on the London Stock
Exchange when the latter operated as a dealer market. This set of results from di¤erent
markets suggests that it may be the structure of the market, not the type of security traded,
which determines if price impact increases or decreases with trade size. In dealer markets,
price impact is smaller for large trades, perhaps because in fragmented markets large traders
have enough bargaining power to obtain better trading terms. In limit-order markets, price
impact for larger trades may reect inventory risk and adverse selection making such trades
19See Panel C of Table 6 in Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007). The table report round-trip rather
than one-way costs.
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costly for liquidity suppliers.
What is most striking, in our view, is that trading costs in the modern data are as high as
they are relative to the historical costs. The underlying costs of the trading process include
the communication costs of identifying and matching counter parties and the data-processing
costs of managing and tracking inventory and orders. In other sectors of the economy these
costs have fallen dramatically due to technological progress.
7 Convertible Bonds and Stocks
A relatively recent example of migration from the Exchange to the OTC market is o¤ered
by the convertible bond market. As can be seen in Figure 1, Panel A, and in Figure 4, there
was a modest revival of the NYSE bond market in the late 1960s. This was due to the rise of
the convertible market, and the interest that retail investors took in this market. An early
indication of this evolution is given in the 1967 NYSE fact book (page 14):
Bond volume on the exchange in 1966 was the highest since 1943... the 50
bonds with the largest volume accounted for 65% of the activity... Among the 50
most active bonds, 42 were either convertible bonds or bonds maturing within a
year or so... Convertible bonds are exempt from the FRB margin requirements
at banks and, when selling above the conversion price, rise and fall with the
stock into which they are convertible. Thus, these bonds have more appeal to
individual traders and investors than do straight corporate bonds.
Volume in bonds during 1967 was higher yet. As mentioned on page 15 in the NYSE
fact book for that year, convertible bonds amounted to 63% of all the bond trading volume.
The next years continued to see high bond trading volume on the Exchange, and signicant
retail activity. For example, the 1972 fact book notes, on page 17: Individual investors
continued to be attracted to the bond market in 1971.And a few sentences later: Of the
50 leading bonds, 32 were convertible issues, the same number as in 1970.Then, as can be
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seen in Figures 1 and 4, bond trading on the Exchange declined again. As was explained to
us by a bond broker who operated in that market at the time, as the market for convertibles
matured, it became dominated by large institutions. The latter chose to direct their orders
to the OTC market, and liquidity migrated away from the Exchange. Correspondingly, in
1973, the NYSE fact book, noted, on page 17, that: individual investors participation in
the bond market diminished.This anecdotal evidence is consistent with our argument that
when the weight of institutions reaches a critical point, small traders are forced to follow
large traders to the OTC venue.
An obvious question is why exchange trading remained predominant in the stock market,
in such a stark contrast with the bond market. One important di¤erence between bond and
stock trading on the Exchange is that, while the bond market has always been purely order
driven, specialists have traditionally supplied liquidity in the stock market. It is possible that
the presence of the specialist anchored the liquidity on the exchange. Because it was common
knowledge that the specialist would be there to supply liquidity, small and medium sized
trades could continue to be directed to the exchange. Because liquidity attracts liquidity,
the larger traders also found it attractive to trade there, in line with the logic of Admati and
Peiderer (1988).
Our arguments in previous sections also suggest that exchange-based trading was to be
expected as long as small investors played an important role in the market. Consistent with
this prediction, the rise of institutional investors was weaker and more delayed in the stock
market than in the bond market. In the bond market it took place in the 1930s and the 1940s,
while in the stock market it only started in the second half of the 1950s. Quite remarkably,
this is when the Exchange introduced Rule 394 (later Rule 390), which prohibited NYSE
members from trading NYSE listed securities away from the Exchange. As noted by White
(2000, page 784): The NYSE specialists lobbied their exchange to adopt Rule 394 in 1955
to prevent commission houses from abandoning the oor of the exchange for telephones.
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8 Conclusions
When several trading venues are available there can be multiple equilibria in the allocation
of trades. When the investors expect that one market venue will attract all or most orders,
they direct their own orders to that market, thus conrming the initial expectation. Hence,
liquidity may not gravitate to the most e¢ cient trading venue, and market forces may fail
to correct this ine¢ ciency, even in the long term. The history of the bond market in the
US in the 20th century o¤ers an interesting illustration of these tensions. Bond trading was
quite active on the NYSE until the 1940s. Then it collapsed as trading migrated to the
OTC market. This was not due to a decline in the role of bond nancing in the economy
or to a drop in the number of listings. The migration of liquidity happened at times when
large institutions became more important in the bond market. This migration appears to
have signicantly increased transactions cost for retail investors. We estimate that these
costs in the recent period are greater than they were in the 1920s for municipal bonds and
comparable to those prevailing in the 1940s for corporate bonds. Given the evident decrease
in communication and processing costs in the intervening years, this appears anomalous.
37
REFERENCES
Admati, A., Peiderer, P., 1988, A theory of intraday patterns: Volume and price
variability.Review of Financial Studies 1, 3-40.
Anonymous, 1932, Confessions of a Bond Salesman, Early Publishing Co, Pittsburgh,
PA.
Bernhardt, D., V. Dvoracek, E. Hughson, and I. Werner, 2005, Why do large orders
receive discounts on the London Stock Exchange?Review of Financial Studies 18, 1343-
1368.
Bessembinder, H., W. Maxwell, and K. Venkataraman, 2007, Market transparency, liq-
uidity externalities, and institutional trading costs in corporate bonds,Journal of Financial
Economics 82, 251-288.
Biais, B., L. Gosten, and S. Spatt, 2005, Market microstructure: A survey of micro-
foundations, empirical results, and policy implications, Journal of Financial Markets 8,
111-264.
Chamberlain, L., 1925, The principles of bond investment, Henry Holt and Company,
New York.
Collin-Dufresne, P., B. Junge and A. Trolle, 2017, Market structure and transaction
costs of index CDSs,Working paper, HEC.
Dammon, R., C. Spatt and H. Zhang, 2004, Optimal asset location and allocation with
taxable and tax-deferred investing,Journal of Finance 59, 999-1037.
Davis, L., L. Neal and E. White, 2005, The highest price ever: The great NYSE seat
sale of 1928-1929, and capacity constraints,Working paper, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Di Maggio, M., A. Kermani, and Z. Song, 2016, The value of trading relationships in
turbulent times,Working paper, Harvard Business School.
Edwards, A., L. Harris, and M. Piwowar, 2007, Corporate bond market transparency
and transactions costs, Journal of Finance 62, 1421-1452.
38
Felstein, S. G., Fabozzi, F. J., and Fabozzi, T. D., 1995, Municipal bonds, in The
Handbook of Fixed Income Securities, 4th edition, Fabozzi, F.J. and Fabozzi, T. D., Editors.
Irwin Professional Publishing, New York, pp. 155-185.
Gellermann, H., 1957, How to Make Money Make Money: Professional Advice About
Stocks and Bonds, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York.
Goldstein, M., E. Hotchkiss, and E. Sirri, 2007, Transparency and liquidity: A controlled
experiment on corporate bonds,Review of Financial Studies 20, 235-273.
Green, R., B. Hollield, and N. Schürho¤, 2007a, Financial intermediation and costs of
trading in an opaque market,Review of Financial Studies 20, 275-314.
Green, R., B. Hollield, and N. Schürho¤, 2007b, Dealer intermediation and price be-
havior in the aftermarket for new bond issues,Journal of Financial Economics 86, 643-682.
Guthmann, H., 1950, The movement of debt to institutions and its implications for the
interest rate,Journal of Finance, 5, 70-87.
Harris, L., and M. Piwowar, 2006, Secondary trading costs in the municipal bond mar-
ket,Journal of Finance 61, 1361-1397.
Hickman, W. B., 1960, Statistical measures of corporate bond nancing since 1900, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton.
Holland, D., 1958, The Income-Tax Burden on Stockholders. National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Jones, C., 2002, A century of stock market liquidity and trading costs,Working paper,
Columbia University.
Kemmerer, D., 1952, American nancial institutions: The marketing of securities, 1930-
1952.Journal of Economic History, 4, 454-468.
Lee, T., and C. Wang, 2018, Why trade over-the-counter? When investors want price
discrimination, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Loss, L., and J. Seligman, 1998, Securities Regulation, Aspen Law and Business, New
York.
39
Meltzer, A. and G. von der Linde, 1960, A study of the dealer market for Federal
Government securities,Materials prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of
the United States, Washington.
Nagel, J., 2016, Markets committee electronic trading in xed income markets. Tech.
rep. 9789291974207, Bank for International Settlements.
Pagano, M., 1989, Trading volume and asset liquidity,Quarterly Journal of Economics
104, 255-276. 32
Prime, J., 1946, Investment Analysis. Prentice-Hall, New York.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, 1995, What do we know about capital structure?: Some
evidence from international data.Journal of Finance, 50, 1421-1460.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, 2003, The great reversals: The politics of nancial develop-
ment in the twentieth century.Journal of Financial Economics, 69, pages 5-50.
Riggs, L., E. Onur, D. Rei¤en, H. Zhu, 2018, Swap trading after Dodd-Frank: Evidence
from index CDS,Working paper, MIT.
Shultz, B., 1946, The securities market and how it works, Harper Bros Publishers, New
York.
United States Treasury and Federal Reserve Board, 1959, Treasury-Federal Reserve
Study of the Government Securities Market.
White, E., 2000, Banking and nance in the twentieth century. In The Cambridge
Economic History of the United States, Volume III. Edited by S. Engerman and R. Gallman.
Cambridge University Press.
40
Table 1: Commission schedule on bonds, 1943-1947.
The body of the table contains commissions per $1,000 of par value on corporate bonds.
For non-members, allied members:
Price per $100 par 1 or 2 bonds 3 bonds 4 bonds > 5 bonds
< $10 $1.50 $1.20 $0.90 $0.75
 $10 < $100 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.25
> $100 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.50
For members, no principal given up:
Price per $100 par 1 or 2 bonds 3 bonds 4 bonds > 5 bonds
< $10 $0.800 $0.700 $0.600 $0.500
 $10 < $100 1.000 0.875 0.750 0.625
> $100 2.000 1.750 1.500 1.250
For members, principal given up:
Price per $100 par 1 or 2 bonds 3 bonds 4 bonds > 5 bonds
< $10 $0.280 $0.265 $0.250 $0.250
 $10 < $100 0.425 0.400 0.375 0.375
> $100 0.850 0.800 0.750 0.750
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Table 2: Historical Municipal Bonds Sample.
Summary statistics for 6 New York City municipal bonds trading on the NYSE over 292
trading days from July 1, 1926 through December 31, 1927 and July 1, 1928 to March 31,
1930. The Spread is the bid-ask spread from quotes at 11 a.m. each day. The Price Impact
is the distance between transaction prices and the midpoint of the spread.
Issued-Maturity Coupon Trade days per year Mean Spread Mean price impact
1904-1954 3.50 18.00 0.73 % 0.20 %
1907-1957 4.50 42.00 0.64 % 0.19 %
1908-1958 4.00 14.00 0.60 % 0.38 %
1909-1959 4.00 30.00 0.48 % 0.25 %
1911-1960 4.25 35.00 0.48 % 0.16 %
1914-1964 4.25 21.00 0.61 % 0.29 %
Mean 4.08 26.67 0.59 % 0.25 %
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Table 3: Price Impact and trade size for Municipal Bonds, 7/26-12/27.
The body of the table contains average percentage price impact, or implicit half-spread,
for trades of di¤erent par value.
par value nobs. % price impact
1K 108 0.2691
2K 53 0.2549
3-4K 42 0.3408
5-9K 49 0.3058
10-14K 20 0.2087
15-29K 10 0.325
>30K 4 0.2992
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Table 4: Modern Municipal Sample.
Summary statistics and descriptive information for New York municipal bonds traded
through registered broker-dealers from 2000-2005. Mean Markup is the average percentage
prot earned by dealers on round-trip transactions initiated by a purchase from a customer.
Rating Issued Maturity Trade days per year Mean Markup
AAA_S 1-Jul-84 1-Jun-23 0.84 2.86%
Insured 15-Jan-87 15-Jun-17 18.57 2.37%
Insured 1-Jun-87 15-Jun-17 3.58 2.31%
Insured 1-Jun-87 15-Jun-17 1.68 2.48%
Insured 15-Jan-87 15-Jun-17 51.58 1.81%
AAA_S 01-Oct-93 01-Jun-23 50.95 2.20%
Insured 15-Nov-93 01-Nov-17 43.32 2.60%
Insured 05-Oct-89 01-Oct-16 18.11 3.72%
Insured 01-Jun-90 15-Aug-15 22.74 3.52%
Insured 05-Oct-89 01-Oct-17 24.21 2.80%
Insured 05-Oct-89 01-Oct-18 27.58 3.44%
Insured 23-Feb-90 01-Aug-18 11.79 2.18%
Insured 26-Sep-90 15-Mar-18 13.26 4.05%
Insured 01-Jun-90 15-Aug-17 22.32 3.51%
Insured 05-Oct-89 01-Oct-19 24.00 2.89%
Insured 23-Feb-90 01-Aug-19 13.47 3.13%
Insured 27-Sep-90 15-Mar-19 35.79 2.90%
Insured 14-Oct-93 01-Oct-19 14.11 2.04%
Insured 27-May-93 15-May-16 10.74 1.60%
Insured 17-Nov-93 15-Jun-19 56.42 2.04%
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Table 4: Modern Municipal Sample (continued).
Rating Issued Maturity Trade days per year Mean Markup
Insured 17-Nov-93 15-Jun-19 82.53 2.07%
Insured 15-May-93 15-Feb-22 46.32 2.12%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-20 89.40 2.37%
Insured 17-Nov-93 15-Jun-19 72.00 2.05%
Insured 15-Jan-87 15-Jun-17 103.42 1.81%
Insured 07-Mar-91 15-Jun-16 16.42 1.00%
Insured 17-Nov-93 15-Jun-19 15.37 1.83%
Insured 15-Jun-92 15-Jun-21 33.05 1.30%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-18 28.84 2.29%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-18 34.74 2.17%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-17 14.11 2.17%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-17 17.89 1.96%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-17 19.58 2.23%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-20 49.93 2.37%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-20 49.45 2.17%
Insured 13-Aug-92 15-Jun-20 57.06 2.33%
Insured 01-Jul-93 01-Jan-18 50.53 2.78%
Insured 01-Jul-93 01-Jan-20 64.42 1.78%
Insured 19-Sep-90 01-Jul-20 85.47 4.22%
Average 34.45 2.40%
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Table 5: Average vs. Predicted Trade Costs.
Based on the coe¢ cients of the regression of trading costs onto trading frequency and
trading volume estimated in the modern sample, the Fitted Value predicts trading costs for
the historical sample of bonds.
Issued-Maturity Mean Spread Plus commission Fitted Value Di¤erence
1904-1954 0.73 % 1.13% 2.451% -1.320%
1907-1957 0.64 % 1.04% 2.196% -1.158%
1908-1958 0.60 % 1.00% 2.486% -1.488%
1909-1959 0.48 % 0.88% 2.306% -1.428%
1911-1960 0.48 % 0.88% 2.289% -1.406%
1914-1964 0.61 % 1.01% 2.455% -1.444%
Mean 0.59 % 0.99% 2.364% -1.374%
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Table 6: Number of trades and average trade size in six corporate bonds.
Number of trades 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 Mean
Baltimore and Ohio 1151 1925 1333 652 766 1165
Great Northern 435 298 243 181 173 266
Hudson & Manhattan 1269 1310 1379 1372 1491 1364
American Tobacco 660 639 492 457 631 576
Firestone 1224 267 168 172 307 428
Saguenay Power 198 113 108 116 51 117
Mean 823 759 621 492 570 653
Average trade size 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 Mean
Baltimore and Ohio 6.64 6.83 6.25 4.77 4.12 5.72
Great Northern 4.28 3.85 3.45 3.04 2.28 3.38
Hudson & Manhattan 5.17 5.29 5.41 5.55 3.94 5.07
American Tobacco 6.00 5.08 4.56 4.37 3.73 4.75
Firestone 4.88 3.99 4.14 3.52 3.76 4.06
Saguenay Power 4.39 2.83 4.00 5.58 5.63 4.49
Mean 5.23 4.64 4.64 4.47 3.91 4.58
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Table 7: Percentage Bid-Ask Spreads and Price Impact for Corporate Bonds.
year % bid-ask % price impact
spread 1K 2K 3-4K 5-9K 10-14K
American Tobacco 1943 0.229 0.111 0.133 0.115 0.100 0.100
1944 0.291 0.146 0.140 0.171 0.159 0.124
1945 0.290 0.139 0.147 0.139 0.127 0.110
1946 0.428 0.199 0.208 0.187 0.189 0.265
1947 0.420 0.177 0.176 0.186 0.189 0.123
n 1423 832 520 494 664 221
Firestone 1943 0.198 0.152 0.180 0.146 0.142 0.112
1944 0.148 0.189 0.169 0.149 0.171 0.131
1945 0.211 0.199 0.199 0.169 0.139 0.298
1946 0.172 0.193 0.181 0.183 0.118 0.237
1947 0.247 0.285 0.268 0.220 0.120 0.205
n 1426 398 239 224 284 78
Saguenay 1943 0.214 0.241 0.242 0.301 0.350 0.090
1944 0.227 0.267 0.210 0.180 0.253
1945 0.382 0.249 0.350 0.230 0.171 0.197
1946 0.147 0.243 0.205 0.198 0.185 0.208
1947 0.232 0.473 0.265 0.340 0.216 0.299
n 1290 160 111 110 128 49
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Table 7: Percentage Bid-Ask Spreads and Average Price Impact for Corporate
Bonds (continued).
year % bid-ask % price impact
spread 1K 2K 3-4K 5-9K 10-14K
B&O Railroad 1943 0.885 0.480 0.502 0.496 0.476 0.473
1944 0.662 0.332 0.412 0.362 0.385 0.394
1945 0.431 0.188 0.192 0.193 0.177 0.190
1946 0.847 0.059 0.476 0.349 0.352 0.352
1947 1.317 0.524 0.520 0.478 0.481 0.486
n 1386 1580 925 1062 1461 598
Hudson Manhattan 1943 0.984 0.658 0.685 0.787 0.695 0.701
1944 0.888 0.516 0.503 0.634 0.595 0.555
1945 0.858 0.464 0.467 0.439 0.476 0.396
1946 0.956 0.541 0.553 0.536 0.528 0.690
1947 1.494 0.716 0.766 1.033 0.998 1.260
n 1421 1802 1149 1162 1685 593
Great Northern 1943 0.522 0.396 0.408 0.790 0.188 0.291
1944 0.540 0.250 0.226 0.256 0.216 0.153
1945 0.881 0.402 0.530 0.229 0.391 0.195
1946 0.961 0.426 0.360 0.411 0.398 0.378
1947 2.171 0.936 0.768 0.684 0.920 0.439
n 1338 529 253 220 219 63
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Table 8: Transactions costs by trade size.
Columns 3 and 4 report price impact as a fraction of the midpoint, in basis points.
Columns 5 and 6 add to the price impact the commission, using the schedule in Table 1 to
determine one-way transactions costs, as a fraction of the midpoint in basis points.
trade size number price impact 1-way cost
(thousands) trades mean median mean median
1 5301 40.42 23.67 81.63 66.23
2 3197 41.93 23.75 82.99 66.47
3 1884 40.87 23.75 73.47 56.94
4 1388 50.10 23.87 74.76 48.87
5 2236 46.38 23.68 66.91 43.98
6 766 36.09 23.65 56.33 43.79
7 562 46.65 23.42 66.77 43.11
8 486 38.17 23.88 58.23 43.82
9 388 32.98 20.22 53.33 42.07
10 810 39.74 22.35 59.96 42.46
11 276 44.05 23.71 64.17 42.72
12 207 38.46 24.33 58.25 44.39
13 166 72.85 24.36 92.36 43.83
14 144 47.05 23.84 67.19 43.87
15 250 47.65 29.13 67.16 48.72
20 104 44.31 25.32 64.99 46.98
25 69 31.14 26.25 50.83 42.19
30 11 39.80 24.10 59.17 48.19
35 15 35.34 12.06 57.28 36.19
40 9 77.42 57.80 96.92 72.25
50 15 39.23 23.98 59.92 47.27
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Table 9: Regression of trading cost measures on trade size and time.
In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is price impact as a fraction of the mid-
point price, measured in basis points. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable includes
commission. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
% price impact % 1-way cost
xed no xed xed no xed
e¤ects e¤ects e¤ects e¤ects
intercept 19.424 33.832 65.523 75.518
(3.629) (16.403) (12.220) (36.618)
days from 1-1-43 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.007
(2.723) (4.238) (2.463) (4.220)
trade size (ln) 2.258 2.900 -6.650 -6.324
(2.392) (3.059) (-7.029) (-6.670)
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Figure 1, Panel A:
Turnover in NYSE listed bonds 
(par value of trading volume/amount outstanding, 
data source NYSE website)
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Figure 1, Panel B:
Bond trading on the NYSE as a % of stock trading
$ value of trading volume. Source: NYSE website 
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Figure 4: 
Bond listing and trading on the NYSE,1925-2003
 Source: NYSE website
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Figure 5, Panel A: Corporate Bond Ownership 
Sources: Guthman, 1950 and FED
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Figure 5, Panel B: Municipal Bond Ownership
Sources: Guthman (1950) and FED)
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Figure 6, Panel A: Monthly trading volume on the NYSE 
for our sample of 6 municipal bondss
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Figure 6, Panel B: Average price impact of trades on the 
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Figure 7: Seat prices, stock volume and bond
volume on the NYSE between 1890 and 1928
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